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THE ANTEPENULTIMACY OF THE BEGINNING 
IN HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 
David Gray Carlson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps the single most perplexing problem in Hegel's Science of 
Logic is the status of its beginning. 
Hegel famously insisted that philosophy must be self-grounding. 
It cannot start from givens. For Hegel, presupposition is the enemy of 
science. "[S]tupid—I can find no other word for it," he remarked.' 
Accordingly, if Hegel's own beginning rests on unjustified presupposi­
tion, then his project is defeated at the start. This is a problem Hegel 
worried about and claimed to have solved.^ 
Hegel is usually read as excusing his presuppositional beginning by 
making his first step the very last step of the Logic. On this interpreta­
tion, the beginning is admittedly a contingency or a choice by the sub­
jective will of the philosopher,^ but the first step is proven when it 
becomes the last step in the logic. As Hegel puts it. The essential re­
quirement for the science of logic is not so much that the beginning be a 
pure immediacy, but rather that the whole of the science be within itself 
a circle in which the first is also the last and the last is also the first. 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
1 G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 41-42 (A.V. Miller trans., 1969) [hereinaf­
ter SL]; G.W.F. HEGEL, WISSENSCHAFT DER LOGIK 21 (1975) [hereinafter WL]. 
2 See MICHAEL N. FORSTER, HEGEL AND SKEPTICISM (1989); William Maker, Beginning, 
in ESSAYS ON HEGEL'S LOGIC 36 (George di Giovanni ed., 1990). 
3 Hegel remarks, "All that is present is simply the resolve ... to consider thought as such. 
SL, supra note 1, at 70; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 54. See also G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S LOGIC 
§ 17 (William Wallace trans., 1975) ("To speak of a beginning of philosophy has a meaning 
only in relation to a person who proposes to commence the study, and not in relation to the 
science as science."); CLARK BUTLER, HEGEL S LOGIC: BETWEEN DIALECTIC AND HISTORY 1 
(1996) ("the project of defining the absolute ... is certainly presupposed."). 
4 SL, supra note 1, at 71; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 56. Compare with the Philosophy of Right. 
Philosophy forms a circle. It has an initial or immediate point—for it must begin 
somewhere—a point which is not demonstrated and is not a result. But the starting 
point of philosophy is immediately relative, for it must appear at another end-point as 
a result. Philosophy is a sequence which is not suspended in mid-air; it does not 
begin immediately, hut is rounded off within itself. 
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I would like to propose a refinement, however. I wish to defend 
the proposition that die last, ultimate step of the Science of Logic is not 
the first step. Rather, the first step of the logic is the antepenultimate 
step—the third from the last—in the Science of Logic as a whole. 
This interpretation allows for an answer to a question that has 
bothered readers of Hegel's first chapter on pure being. There, Hegel 
emphasizes the identity of being and nothing. If these are identical, how 
can their difference be discerned? The question boils down to this: 
Where does difference come from?^ If one thing is clear, the result of 
the identity of being and nothing is becoming—a concept that depends 
on a difference between being and nothing. Becoming, Hegel empha­
sizes, is "a movement in which both [being and nothing] are distin­
guished . . . Yet, in the obliterative regime of pure being, how can 
difference be accounted for? 
If we see Hegel as beginning with the antepenultimate step in his 
logical system, we can provide a ready answer to the origin of difference, 
on which becoming depends. On my interpretation, difference is pre­
supposed, as Hegel's critics have alleged. What is different in becoming 
is absolute knowing (the ultimate step) and pure immediacy (the ante­
penultimate step). Becoming summarizes the difference between these 
two—not the difference between being and nothing as such. To state 
this point in slightly different terms, pure being was supposed to be 
absolute knowing—the Understanding s propositional summary of it. 
G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPFFY OF RIGHT § 2 (Allen W. Wood ed., 1993) 
(footnote omitted). 
5 John Burbidge, among others, poses this question. See, e.g., JOHN W. BURBIDGE, HEGEL 
ON LOGIC AND REUGION: THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY 14 (1992) ("But from 
what does this second moment of difference and disappearance arise?"). Charles Taylor, whose 
book did much to reverse the eclipse of Hegel's work in the twentieth century, finds this point a 
fatal flaw in the Logic. He writes; 
[TJhe derivation of Becoming here is not as solid as that of Dasein. This is the first, 
but not the last place in the Logic where Hegel will go beyond what is strictly estab­
lished by his argument, because he sees in the relation of concepts a suggestion of his 
ontology But of course as probative arguments these passages are unconvincing. 
They fail, as strict conceptual proof, however persuasive they are as interpretations for 
those who hold Hegel's view of things on other grounds. Thus, in this case, the 
notion of becoming imposes itself supposedly because of the passage from Being to 
Nothing and back; but this is a passage which our thought is forced to when we 
contemplate either . . . |W]e cannot trade on this principle at this stage. 
CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL 233 (1975) (footnote omitted). Taylor's plaint is that the movement 
between Being and Nothing can only be "for us" and must exceed the bounds of the sparse 
logical development available at the end of the first chapter. 
6 SL, supra note 1, at 83; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 67. 
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But it ended up being nothing at all—a failure/ If there is a difference 
between being and nothing, it can only be discerned from a perspective 
that remembers absolute knowing and compares pure nothing as the 
result of the attempt to summarize absolute knowing in an immediate 
way. 
To see how Hegel's Anfang is antepenultimate, we begin—in the 
style of Harold Pinter or the film noir Memento—at the end. To turn 
the tables on Leonard Nimoy, only by recalling the future may we com­
prehend the past. 
II. HEGEL'S LAST CHAPTER 
Hegel's last chapter in the Science of Logic is entitled "The Absolute 
Idea." Generally speaking, idea is the negative unity of subject and ob­
ject. Throughout the last third of the Science of Logic—the Subjective 
Logic—the notion or concept {Begrijf) theorizes itself. It produces an 
objective account of its subjective self by transporting itself from subject 
into predicate. This occurs in the chapter entitled syllogism {Schluf), 
which is perhaps better translated as "inference."® In effect, the subject 
infers its own objectivity. Yet, it finds itself alienated from its self-infer­
ence and enters into a subject/object relation. 
Idea is the dynamic quality that both subject and predicate share: 
each on its own logic has no right against the other. Each sacrifices itself 
on behalf of the other, pointing to the other as the source of its being. 
Idea is the common element of self-sacrifice—the inability of any posi-
tivized concept to maintain itself against its other. 
Absolute idea arises when both the true (or thinking) and the good 
(or doing) give up their pretensions. What ends up being true is that 
Kantian philosophy is a failure. The truth is that there is no thing-in-
itself; it is just an illusion that passes away like any other appearance.^ 
The good (or practical) idea, in contrast, is the obliteration of anything 
7 It is possible to see Pure Being as the form of Absolute Knowing and Pure Nothing as the 
content of it. The job of form is to disappear in favor of a deeper truth. And nothingness is the 
deeper truth. SLAVOJ 2IZEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO: ENJOYMENT AS A PO­
LITICAL FACTOR 53 (1991). 
8 "It is evident that the term 'syllogism' is the worst possible translation for the German 
word Schluf, which does not signify the well-known scholastic technique for reaching a conclu­
sion, hut rather the 'issue,' the 'unification,' the 'reconciliation' of the artificial distinctions of 
the understanding." EUGENE FLEISCHMANN, LA SCIENCE UNIVERSELLE OU LA LOGIQUE DE 
HEGEL 266 (1968) (author's translation). 
9 SL, supra note 1, at 785; 2 WL, supra note 1, at 440-41. 
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that stands in the way of the subject's freedom. The good is action, and 
"[a]ll action presupposes a reality 'alien' to the doer "[Ajction, 
in addition, "treats the world as an empty receptacle for the actualiM-
tion of its subjective purposes . . . . The true good, then, is the 
realization that the only obstacle to the subject's freedom and selt-
knowledge is the very falsehood that the subject manufactured in theo­
rizing about itself. The good and the true each sacrifice themselves; this 
commonality shared by the true and the good is absolute idea. 
Absolute idea is also called method. From the foregoing account of 
self-sacrifice and self-erasure, it should be clear that method is very, very 
negative. The method is that all affirmative propositions must obliterate 
themselves as inadequate to their own object. The Science of Logic, then, 
is thoroughly Spinozist in nature. For Spinoza, 'fdjeterminateness is ne­
gation . . . ; this true and simple insight establishes the absolute unity of 
substance."'^ So it is for Hegel, with the key difference that Hegel's 
substance is so negative that it positivizes itself, only to dissolve its posi­
tive implication. 
Like all concepts in the Science of Logic, absolute idea is put 
through the gauntlet of three logical steps. The first is the step of the 
Understanding. The Understanding makes immediate propositions. 
"The understanding considers all encountered beings ... to be at peace, 
fixed, limited, univocally defined, individual, and positive.'"^ To pro­
duce this stable, reliable account of reality and in order to make sense of 
the materials before it, the Understanding must always leave something 
out—reality is ultimately dynamic, but the Understanding is static. 
Dialectical Reason is the critique of the Understanding. It empha­
sizes the omitted materials that the Understanding left out, in order to 
show that the Understanding's proposition is the opposite of what it 
ought to be. Dialectical Reason is in the business of remembering the 
logical sequence that the Understanding suppresses. Memory is the 
10 HERBERT MARCUSE, HEGEL'S ONTOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF HISTORICITY 298 (Seyla 
Benhabib trans., 1987). 
11 Id. at 169. , 
12 SL, supra note 1, at 536; 2 WL. supra note 1, at 164. See Letter L from Benedict de 
Spinoza to Jang Jettis Qune 2, 1674), in 2 THE CHIEF WORKS OF BENEDICT DE SPINOZA 369-
70 (R.H.M. Elwes trans., 1951). 
13 MARCUSE, supra note 10, at 10. 
14 The past is no chronological past, as logical process is not a historical process. For exam­
ple, Hegel refers to essence as "timelessly past - being." SL, supra note 1, at 389; 2 WL, supra 
note 1, at 3. See also BUTLER, supra note 3, § 112 ("Essence we may certainly regard as past 
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stuff that dialectical dreams are made of.^^ Dialectical Reason is tanta­
mount to experience,^® in that theory is shown to be inconsistent with 
the real world known to exist beyond the latest theory. 
Yet Dialectical Reason does not just negate a positive theory. With 
Hegel, nothing is always something; dialectical negativity is just as posi­
tive as that which it critiques. If, according to Dialectical Reason, the 
Understanding has suppressed materials in order to make a positive pro­
position, Dialectical Reason must positivize the suppressed materials. It 
therefore replicates the fault laid upon the doorstep of the 
Understanding.' ̂  
The third step—Speculative Reason—brings together the prior, di­
verse steps of Understanding and Dialectical Reason, pointing out that 
they share a commonality or identity as well as a difference. Indeed, 
their commonality is their difference. In other words, each side posi-
tivizes material and so leaves aside, or expels, the negative, from which it 
purports to be different. It is this excluded negative (difference) that 
Speculative Reason exploits. Speculative Reason is constantly bringing 
this commonality to the fore. 
The three-step process is then repeated. What Speculative Reason 
produces is interpreted by the Understanding. This interpretation is 
one-sided. Once again, something is always left out, which generates 
further steps in the Logic. The move from Speculative Reason to the 
proposition of the Understanding is always retrogressive. In Leninist 
terms, it is always two steps forward after one step back. "[Ajdvance is a 
retreat into ground. . ., " as Hegel puts it.'® Nevertheless, as the Under­
standing interprets the material at hand, the propositions of the Under­
standing become more sophisticated as the Logic progresses. By the 
Being, remembering however meanwhile that the paat is not utterly denied, but only laid aside 
and thus at the same time preserved."). 
15 JOHN MCCUMBER, THE COMPANY OF WORDS: HEGEL, LANGUAGE AND SYSTEMATIC 
PHILOSOPHY 123 (1993) ("[F]or Hegel, thinking—and especially philosophical thinking—is 
basically a highly sophisticated way of remembering—or, as Hegel puts it, intelligence is cogni­
tive only insofar as it is recognitive.") (footnote omitted). 
I<5 KENNETH R. WESTPHAL, HEGEL'S EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM: A STUDY OF THE AIM 
AND METHOD OF HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 130 (1989). 
iz This double nature of Dialectical Reason means that Hegel's triadic system is arguably 
tetrachotomous. SL, supra note 1, at 836; 2 WL, supra note 1, at 498. In the quadratic case, 
Dialectical Reason is counted twice from the perspective of Speculative Reason, which sees Dia­
lectical Reason as self-alienated. SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE TICKLISH SUBJECT: THE ABSENT CENTRE 
OF POLITICAL ONTOLOGY 79-80 (1999). 
18 SL, supra note 1, at 71; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 56. 
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time the Understanding reaches the mesne realm of Essence, ^1 its pro­
positions are negative and dialectical in nature. In effect, the Under­
standing transforms itself into Dialectical Reason. By the time the 
Understanding reaches the realm of Notion, it sees things speculatiw y. 
Understanding thus transforms itself into Speculative Reason.^® The 
Science of Logic ends when the Understanding, Dialectical Reason, and 
Speculative Reason converge in absolute idea. Taken together, they are 
method. . 
Because all that exists is the implosion of appearance, the 
theme of the Science of Logic is that there is no mysterious "beyond" to 
the realm of appearances.^" It is appearances all the way down, and 
appearance must erase itself in favor of a beyond that turns out not even 
to be there.2' ^ Hegel remarks in the Phenomenology, "behind the so-
called curtain which is supposed to conceal the inner world, there is 
nothing to be seen unless we go behind it ourselves, as much in order 
that we may see, as that there may be something behind there which can 
beseem"" .jr. 
Aphanisis—disappearance of the subject—is the very idea of the 
Science of Logic. For Hegel, this aphanisis takes on a special meaning at 
the advanced level of idea. To see why, it is necessary to drop back ^d 
consider the very core of Hegel's system-the true infinite, which mjes 
its official appearance in the second chapter of the Science of Lope, i he 
true infinite plays off the logical implication of finitude. A finite thing, 
by its own logic, must come to an end. Otherwise, it would not be 
finite. When it does end, the thing has become what it ought to be-
nothing. Yet, for Hegel, nothing is, after all, something. If the finite 
thing passes away, the memory of it remains. The finite thing obtains 
an ideal existence when it ceases to be. Yet, in its ideal form, being is 
subject to recollection. The German for recollection is Emnerung, 
19 For this reason, "self-contradiction comes in degrees." FORSTER, supra note 2, at 140. 
20 See JEAN HYPPOUTE, LOGIC AND EXISTENCE 90 (Leonard Lawlor & Amit Sen trans., 
1997) ("The only secret, however, is that there is no secret."); ROBERT B PIPPIN, HEGEL S 
IDEALISM: THE SATISPACTIONS OP SELP-CONSCIOUSNESS 206 (1989) ('[T]he 
this section is to argue that there is literally nothing'hesyonp or behind or 
human experience of the world of appearances, and certainly not FThwI 
ROSEN G.W.F. HEGEL: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OP WISDOM 44 ( 97 ) ( 
is for Hegel nothing 'behind' that process, no hidden source or God from which Being 
'"?E2ANNO BENCIVENGA, HEGEL'S DIALECTICAL LOGIC 41 (2000) ("Reality is structure 
(form) all the way down;"). , 10771 
22 G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OP SPIRIT. 9 165, at 103 (A.V. Miller trans., 1977). 
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which can also be translated as "inwardization." True infinity is there­
fore the process of inwardization. Its place in the Science of Lo^c is the 
very portal from reality to ideality. In effect, ideality constitutes the 
memory of what was {Wesert). The true infinite becomes what it ought 
to be—hut it also remains what it was. It is a unity of its finite self and 
its beyond. The true infinite therefore constantly removes itself from 
self-presence to a beyond—and it brings its beyond into its own pres­
ence. This double movement of cancellation and preservation is fa­
mously called sublatiow^^ what Slavoj Zizek calls the "chiasmic exchange 
of properties."^^ The idea in sublation is that the finite thing invests 
itself into the beyond when it ceases to be, and the beyond invests itself 
into present thought when it ceases to be. In effect, both the finite 
thing and its shadowy beyond renounce their being and assign it to their 
other. 
With the advent of absolute idea, the very idea of a beyond be­
comes untenable. In absolute idea, there is no longer a place to which 
the true infinite can withdraw. At this point, Hegel says, the distinction 
between form and content falls apart. Absolute idea is absolute form, 
"each of whose moments is within itself the totality and hence, as indif­
ferent to the form, is the complete content of the whole. At the point 
where it is understood that there is no beyond, self-sacrificing idea can 
only return to itself, since there is, at this point, no other. Vanishing 
form is content at this stage. The point is sacrifice of self, for self. 
Yet, as I have said, absolute idea must play out the three moments 
of the Understanding, Dialectical Reason, and Speculative Reason. In­
deed, these moments literally are the Understanding, Dialectical Reason 
and Speculative Reason. The moments identified in the last chapter are 
23 "Sublation" is a translation of Aufhebung. The English term is actually derived from 
chemistry. According to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, sublation is "[a] precipitate suspended in 
a liquid, especially urine." Thanks to the English translators of Hegel, it also refers to the 
destruction and preservation of logical moments by the more progressive moment which it gen­
erates. This translative choice has been laid at the doorstep of Geoffrey Mure, an Oxford com­
mentator from the middle of the century. ERROL E. HARRIS, AN INTERPRETATION OP THE 
LOGIC OF HEGEL 30 (1983); see G.R.G. MURE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL 35 (1965) ('"Sub-
lated' will serve as a translation."). 
24 SIAVOJ 2I2EK, supra note 7, at 39-41. A chiasmus is the inversion of the order of syntac­
tical elements in the second of two juxtaposed and syntactically parallel phrases or clauses. An 
example: "All professors are clever men, but clever men aren't all professors;" WALTER NASH, 
RHETORIC: THE WIT OF PERSUASION 114 (1989). 
25 SL, supra note 1, at 531; 2 WL, supra note 1, at 158. 
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method itself—each one moment implying all the others as well as 
itself.^^ 
The first step in the analysis of absolute idea is the antepenultimate 
step of the Science of Logic and, I contend, the true beginning for the 
Science of Logic. This is the step of immediacy. It represents the Under­
standing as such. 
The second step is mediation—all the mediations there are. This 
is the dialectical step in which identity is paired with difference (though, 
covertly. Dialectical Reason actually compares two identities). The sig­
nificance of mediation is that absolute idea is revealed to be an active, 
dialectic thinker that thinks itself. As such, it is personality, something 
that Hegel has declared to be missing in Spinoza's account of sub­
stance—"a defect which has been the main cause of hostility to Spi­
n o z a ' s  s y s t e m  . . . .  
For Spinoza, cognition is external to substance. What is finite is 
not derived from substance but remains alien to it. Finite concepts can 
be dissolved and traced back to substance, but Spinoza cannot travel in 
the opposite direction by deriving such concepts from subst^ce. Ac­
cordingly, Hegel finds that Spinoza's notions of substance, profound 
and correct as they are, are [mere] definitions, which are tmmedtately 
assumed at the outset of the science."^® The absolute cannot be a first. 
It must be the result. 
For Hegel, the concept thinks itself dynamically, and this means it 
is person-like; "The highest, most concentrated point is tht pure person­
ality which, solely through the absolute dialectic which is its nature, no 
less embraces and holds everything within itself because it makes itself the 
supremely free—the simplicity which is the first immediacy and Univer­
sality."^^ Personality implies life, but also the cognition of being alive. 
Life is immediate idea—"impenetrable atomic subjectivity.Life ends 
up standing for self-sacrifice. There can only be life in general if indi­
vidual lives terminate in death. Cognition—the second, dialectical por­
tion of idea^i—is mediated idea. It cognizes itself as Life and so, too, it 
26 As John Burbidgc puts it, "method identifies its own internal conditions, making no 
reference to anything external." JOHN W. BURBIDGE, ON HEGEL'S LOGIC: FRAGMENTS OF A 
COMMENTARY 217 (1981). 
27 SL, supra note 1, at 537; 2 WL, supra note 1, at 164. 
28 SL, supra note 1, at 537; 2 WL, supra note 1, at 164. 
29 SL, supra note 1, at 841; 2 WL, supra note 1, at 502. 
30 SL, supra note 1, at 824; 2 WL, supra note 1, at 484. 
31 SL, supra note 1, at 775-824; 2 WL, supra note 1, at 429-83. 
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sacrifices itself. This implies that absolute knowing—the ultimate 
step—is, as negation of the negation, the sacrifice of self-sacrifice. On 
its own logic. Absolute knowing shows what it is when it stops sacrific­
ing itself and produces some positivized account of itself, an account in 
which Geist aspires not to sacrifice itself. For this reason, in the very last 
step of the Logic, Absolute idea returns to immediacy as its final act of 
self-manifestation. Absolute knowing is therefore the unity of doing (or 
thinking) and being. It is divine creation—what Kant called "intellec­
tual intuition."^  ̂ What it thinks truly is. 
Absolute knowing is the ultimate step in the Science of Logic. Sig­
nificantly, it is also the very last step in the Phenomenology. This con­
gruence is significant because, in the Science of Logic, Hegel expressly 
describes the Phenomenology as presupposed by the Science of Logic. 
Absolute knowing stands for the realization that human consciousness is 
not any basis for scientific philosophizing.^^ In effect, absolute knowl­
edge "ceases itself to be knowledge."^^ It is also all the knowledge there 
is—that there is no knowledge. There is only the appearance of 
knowledge. 
32 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 163-64 (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans. 1990). 
Charles Taylor says that: 
Hegel reproaches Kant [is] for . . . not having cleaved to the notion of an intellectual 
intuition, which he himself invented. This would be an understanding which unlike 
ours did not have to depend on external reception, on being affected from outside, for 
its contents, but created them with its thought. This archetypical intellect Kant at­
tributed to God; it was quite beyond us. But God's intellect is ultimately revealed to 
us for Hegel, it only lives in our thought. Hence we can participate in an intellectual 
intuition. God's thought is ours. 
TAYLOR, supra note 5, at 301. 
33 SL, supra note 1, at 49; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 30. 
34 Professor Winfield complains that Marx, Kierkegaard et al. miss the punch line of the 
Phenomenology. 
Instead of properly regarding absolute knowing as the collapse of the posited structure 
of consciousness, they have commonly interpreted it as a determinate cognition that 
somehow unites subject and object such that its knowing both comprehends and 
constitutes things as they are in themselves. . . . Accordingly, Hegel becomes labeled 
an objective idealist, a philosopher of subject-object identity, a thinker of self-re­
vealing totality, and the consummator of metaphysics for whom thought and being 
are one. 
RICHARD DIEN WINFIELD, OVERCOMING FOUNDATIONS: STUDIES IN SYSTEMATIC PHILOSO­
PHY 26-27 (1989) (footnote omitted). 
35 SL, supra note 1, at 69; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 54. 
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III. HEGEL'S FIRST CHAPTER 
The beginning of the Science of Logic, I contend, is the antepenulti­
mate step from Hegel's last chapter. The beginning is simply the imme­
diate version of absolute knowing. It is what the ultimate step of 
absolute knowing, on its own logic, must produce. For this reason, the 
first step is not, as usually supposed, the ultimate speculative step or the 
penultimate dialectic step, but the antepenultimate step—the Under­
standing, as such. 
The following diagram shows the structure of the beginning in the 
Science of Logic. In this diagram, the left side of the page is to be identi­
fied with positivity. The right side of the page leans to negativity. The 
middle of the page is positivity and negativity thought together. So 
Hegel's beginning, in contrast, is an immediate proposition about 
absolute knowing: 
In this drawing, pure being is shown to be a one-sided view of all 
the knowledge there is. In effect, the concept, if it is to know itself, 
must make a proposition about itself. It must say affirmatively what it 
is.^^ And, given that absolute knowing is the end of the logic, it must 
recall, or remember what it is; being complete and total, whatever it 
once was is now in its (timeless, logical) past. 
3® Andrew Haas correctly suggests that, not pure being, but the decision of the Understand­
ing to abstract pure being from absolute knowing constitutes the true first step of the Logic. 
ANDREW HAAS, HEGEL AND THE PROBLEM OF MULTIPLICITY 91 (2000). Similarly, Walter 
Kaufmann notes that the Logic does not really start from pure being. Rather, the Logic starts 
with the privileging of the immediate over what is mediated. WALTER KAUFMANN, HEGEL: A 
REINTERPRETATION 190 (1978). 
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But this first thought of itself is a failure. It fails even to be a 
thought, for, "there is nothing, nothing in heaven or in nature or mind 
or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and 
mediation, so that these two determinations reveal themselves to be un-
separated and inseparable and the opposition between them to be a nul-
lity."^^ In this recollection, the motor of the logic—contradiction— 
cannot get started.'® Absolute idea perpetually turns the ignition key of 
Understanding and gets no result. In an important, paradoxical way, 
Hegel's beginning is a failure, as many scholars have suspected. But 
Hegel makes his failure his success. The failure to have a thought at all 
is the beginning of the Science ofLogic?'^ And curiously, non-thought is 
37 SL, supra note 1, at 68; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 52. For Adorno, this is the equivalent of 
saying there is "nothing . . . that does not contain, merely by being defined as something that 
exists, the reflection of its mere existence, a spiritual moment." THEODOR W. ADORNO, 
HEGEL: THREE STUDIES 57 (1993). 
38 TAYLOR, supra note 5, at 243. 
39 This justifies Clark Butler's insight: "Hegel's great originality was to have claimed, con­
trary to Aristotle, that an inquiry starting from a false assumption could be a science, and indeed 
was alone qualified to be science." Clark Butler, The Dialectical Method Today: An Essay in 
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highly descriptive of absolute knowing, which is no knowledge at all. 
The Understanding paradoxically succeeds by failing. And in its failure 
it anticipates the final result very presciently—all immediate proposi­
tions must fail. 
Famously, in Hegel's opening chapter in the Science of Logic, pure 
being is shown to be pure nothing.^' But this is simply the identity of 
being and nothing. In the original German, the first sentence of the 
subsection on Becoming reads: "Z)<w reine Sein und das reine Nichts ist 
also dasselber^^ This sentence could be translated as: "Pure being and 
pure nothing is the same." As John Burbidge remarks; The singular 
verb reinforces the content of the sentence to suggest that there is not 
movement at all, but simply a single identity. Strictly speaking, 
"[t]he indeterminate moments of becoming are not true moments; they 
cannot be concretely specified, since such moments are always changing 
into each other and reciprocally cancelling each other.'"^^ 
Hegel adds, however, "they are absolutely distinct, and yet. . . they 
are unseparated and inseparable and . . . each immediately vanishes in its 
Analytical Hegelianism 49 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the CARDOZO PUB. L. 
POLV. & ETHICS J.). See also SLAVOJ liiEK, THE PUPPET AND THE DWARF: THE PERVERSE 
CORE OF CHRISTIANITY 83 (2003) ("[0]ne has to begin by making the 'wrong' choice ... the 
true speculative meaning emerges only through repeated reading, as the afterefFect (or by­
product) of the first, 'wrong' reading."); Angelica Nuzzo, The End of Hegel's Logic: Absolute Idea 
as Absolute Method, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y. & ETHICS J. 203 (2005) ("For Hegel progress is 
made by staying where one is not by looking away aiming at something else. ). 
40 Professor Winfield complains that Marx, Kierkegaard et al. miss the punchline of the 
Phenomenology. See supra text accompanying note 34. 
41 Marcuse is partly right in asserting, "In the foregoing analysis of the concept of being, 
being did not 'turn into' nothing, but both were revealed as identical " HERBERT MARCUSE, 
REASON AND REVOLUTION: HEGEL AND THE RISE OF SOCIAL THEORY 130 (1999). But Mar­
cuse errs in H>-dnring from this fact alone that "every determinate being contains the being as 
well as the nothing." Id. In order for this result to follow, difference is required. But difference 
cannot be found in the non-dialectic relation of pure being and pure nothing. Furthermore, 
Marcuse errs in denying that transition is proper to the realm of being. A/, at 131 ( Moreover, it 
is not quite correct to say that one category 'passes into' another. The dialectical analpis rather 
reveals one category as another, so that the other represents its unfolded content "). Such a 
view denies difference. Transition is the very hallmark of the realm of being. Hegel in fact 
defines becoming as "transition into an other." SL, supra note 1, at 601; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 
240. 
42 1 WL, supra note 1, at 67. 
43 BURBIDGE, supra note 5, at 14. Andrew Haas reads Hegel as making a deliberate gram­
matical mistake to emphasize the inability of ordinary grammar to account for speculative phi­
losophy, which accounts for simultaneous immediacy and mediation. FIAAS, supra note 36, at 
97. 
44 PIPPIN, supra note 20, at 189. 
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oppositeT^^ Any difference between being and nothing is "a merely fan­
cied or imagined difference. In other words, we mortals believe that 
being and nothing is different. But belief has no purchase in logic. As 
Hegel puts it, mere belief "is not in the sequence of this exposition. 
It cannot suffice merely to believe that being and nothing is differ­
ent. We must prove it. Where then does difference come from? It 
specifically is not present in pure being, which is only identical to pure 
nothing. 
I contend that difference precedes pure being in origin. That is to 
say, it is presupposed. Furthermore, its identification depends upon a 
viewpoint that is able to comprehend absolute knowing standing against 
its initial, failed self-interpretation. According to this viewpoint. Specu­
lative Reason compares absolute knowing to the failed attempt of the 
Understanding to account for it. It perceives a vanishing of all thought 
into no thought at all. All thought is different from no thought. In 
short, becoming constitutes the recollection of what once was, com­
pared to what is not now—a ceasing-to-be. But since, for Hegel, noth­
ing is always something, it is just as much a coming-to-be—a be­
coming. Again to quote Burbidge, "The difference that 'reality' in­
troduces is not the result of a simple transition, but has been posited by 
reflection when it added to the immediate content ... its remembered 
parentage. The move came from outside the immediate concept."^® 
This implies that there is no proper beginning for Hegel. He is, as 
Jean-Luc Nancy observes, "the first philosopher for whom there is, ex­
plicitly, neither beginning nor end."^^ An articulation of this principle 
appears in the following passage: 
Simple immediacy is itself an expression of reflection and contains a 
reference to its distinction from what is mediated. This simple imme­
diacy, therefore, in its true expression is pure being. . . . Here the be-
•*5 SL, supra note 1, at 83; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 67. 
^•5 SL, supra note 1, at 92; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 77. 
47 "[D]as nicht in diese Reihe der Darsteilung gehort." 1 WL supra note 1, at 78. A.V. 
Miller's translation puts it more dryly: "Opinion, however, is a form of subjectivity which is not 
proper to an exposition of this kind." SL, supra note 1, at 92; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 77. 
48 BURBIDGE, supra note 5, at 22. 
49 JEAN-LUC NANCY, HEGEL: THE RESTLESSNESS OF THE NEGATIVE 9 Qason Smith & 
Steven Miller eds. 1997) (footnote omitted); see also ADORNO, supra note 37, at 12 ("Correctly 
understood, the choice of a starting point, of what comes first, is a matter of indifference in 
Hegel's philosophy; his philosophy does not recognize a first something of this kind as a fixed 
principle . . . ."). 
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ginning is made with being which is represented as having come to be 
through mediation, a mediation which is also a sublating of itself; and 
there is presupposed pure knowing as the outcome of finite knowing, 
of consciousness. But if no presupposition is to be made and the be­
ginning itself is taken immediately, then its only determination is that 
it is to be the beginning of logic, of thought as such. All that is pre­
sent is simply the resolve, which can also be regarded as arbitrary, that 
we propose to consider thought as such.'" 
In this passage, Hegel admits that the indeterminacy of pure being 
contains a reference to determinacy. Pure being cannot properly disen­
tangle itself from its history. Pure being is different from its history. 
Yet, as pure being, it is immediacy and only immediacy, and, as such, it 
must suppress its history. But without its history, it reduces to mere 
resolve to begin, and, as such, it looks arbitrary. Why should we begin? 
At the beginning this is by no means clear.'' But by the end, we know 
that idea requires its own manifestation. It must begin. 
What pure being is different from is not pure nothing but pure 
knowing—Logic's ultimate step. By way of evidence, in the subsection 
entitled "Nothing," Hegel says: 
To intuit or think nothing has, therefore, a meaning; both are distin­
guished and thus nothing is (exists) in our intuiting or thinking; or 
rather it is empty intuition and thought itself, and the same empty 
intuition or thought as pure being. Nothing is, therefore, the same 
determination, or rather absence of determination, and thus altogether 
the same as, pure being.^^ 
50 SL, supra note 1, at 69-70; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 54. 
51 In Professor Winfield's account, the matter must end here. Rather than viewing the true 
commencement of the Logic as the one-sided proposition of the Understanding, Winfield thinks 
that determinacy arises for no reason: 
One could thus say that the proper answer to the question "Why is there determi­
nacy?" is that there is and can be no reason, for any attempt to assign one presupposes 
determinacy by treating indeterminacy as if it were a definite determiner. All that can 
be offered in answer is an account of how indeterminacy gives rise to something else. 
What is clear from the start is that what follows from indeterminacy must do so 
immediately, which is to say, without reason, and without being determined by 
anything. 
WINFIELD, supra note 34, at 50. But if this is so, there can be no account for how Speculative 
Reason, in arriving at "becoming," finds the tools to differentiate stasis from movement. 
52 SL, supra note 1, at 82; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 67. 
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This passage expressly refers to difference, and what is different is 
thinking and thought. Thinking stands for absolute knowing, which, 
we know from Hegel's last chapter, has the active principle—personal­
ity. The thought, or, more precisely, the failed thought of being/noth­
ing, is passive/identical. The thought contains within itself no 
difference. Difference is, however, already on the scene in becoming. 
What is different is (a) the entire Science ofLo^c as embodied in abso­
lute knowing and (b) the failed, indeterminate thought of being/ 
nothing. 
Admittedly, Hegel emphasizes a movement between pure being 
and pure nothing. In a passage that few have failed to miss as highly 
important, Hegel writes: 
What is the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being—does 
not pass over but has passed over—into nothing .... But it is equally 
true that they are not undistinguished from each other . . . they are 
absolutely distinct, and yet that they are unseparated and inseparable 
and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite. Their truth is, 
therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the 
other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by 
a difference which has equally immediately resolved itself.'^ 
The past tense of pure being and pure nothing is important. Pure 
being and nothing is never before us as a thought—because it is un­
thinkable. It is 2i failed thought. It is retroactively theorized only. And 
in support of this interpretation, it may be noted that Hegel states that 
pure being and pure nothing have no separate subsistence of their own 
but are only in becoming . For this reason, becoming is not, 
strictly speaking, a transition. With transition, Hegel writes, one tends 
to think of the two terms, from one of which transition is made to the 
other, as at rest, apart from each other, the transition taking place be­
tween them."" Since pure being and nothing is less than thought, the 
two terms cannot be brought together in the relation Hegel calls 
transition.^® 
53 SL, supra note 1, at 82-83; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 67. 
54 SL, supra note 1, at 93; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 79. 
55 SL, supra note 1, at 93; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 79. 
56 See ROSEN, supra note 20, at 111 ("There is, then, never a transition 'taking place' from 
Being to Nothing and thence to Becoming; instead, such a transition has already taken place 
. . . ."). 
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Hegel refers to movement between being and nothing. Strictly 
speaking, this movement has to be understood not as the movement 
between being and nothing, but as the movement from absolute know­
ing (or active thinking) to being/nothing, its first failed proposition 
about itself.^^ This is no move forward but a move back from the ulti­
mate step of absolute knowing to the antepenultimate step of immedi­
acy. In describing what it is, absolute knowing must recall its 
beginning. Recollection of the antepenultimate step then becomes the 
first step of the Science of Logic. 
Further evidence of Hegel's intent can be brought to bear. At the 
opening of his essay, "W^ith what must the Science Begin? , Hegel states 
that the beginning can be either mediated or unmediated but either 
way of beginning is refuted in advance.^® In other words, the beginning 
must fail. If it did not, then there would be no possibility of progress 
beyond the beginning. "Hence the advance is not a kind of superfluity, 
this it would be if that with which the beginning is made were in truth 
already the absolute .... In short, it is the very nature of a begin­
ning that it must fail; otherwise it would be result—not beginning.^" 
Compared to its origin in absolute knowing, the beginning of pure 
being is "concentrated into this unity [that] has sublated all reference to 
an other and to mediation . . . This is what the beginning must 
be—abstract and unmediated, because mediation points to some other, 
prior step that is actually the true beginning. And yet this reference to 
other is precisely what pure being implies. To repeat what Hegel has 
said, "Simple immediacy is itself an expression of refleaion and contains 
a reference to its distinction from what is mediated."^^ In other words, 
in spite of itself, pure being refers to something other than itself, and so 
57 This meaning underwrites Hegel's remark that being and nothing sink from their ini­
tially imagined self-subsistence to the status of moments, which are still distinct but at the same 
time are sublated." SL, supra note 1, at 105; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 92. Absolute knowing is 
self-subsistent, and pure being is the Understanding's proposition about absolute knowing. 
Only an overarching perspective that recalls absolute knowing and its difference from being/ 
nothing can see in being/nothing a ceasing-to-be and a becoming. 
58 SL, supra note 1, at 67; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 51. 
59 SL, supra note 1, at 829; 2 WL, supra note 1, at 489. 
60 As Kathleen Dow Magnus puts it: "Implicit to the meaning of self-determination, how­
ever, is the experience of not having been what one determines oneself to be. Genuine self-
determination requires that one was not 'always already' self-determining. For Hegel, there is no 
such thing as simply being self-determining." KATHLEEN DOW MAGNUS, HEGEL AND THE 
SYMBOLIC MEDIATION OF SPIRIT 235 (2001). 
61 SL, supra note 1, at 69; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 54. 
62 SL, supra note 1, at 69; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 54. 
2004] THE ANTEPENULTIMACY OF THE BEGINNING 241 
as a beginning it is a failure. This requires an overarching perspective 
that can discern the difference between absolute knowing, on the one 
hand, and being and nothing, on the other. 
IV. BECOMING AS THE TRUE BEGINNING 
Pure being is merely identical to, not different from, pure nothing. 
Accordingly, pure being and pure nothing are not even moments. 
Rather, they are retrospective reflections on what must have been. As 
Marcuse puts it, "Hegel says explicitly that not being but having been 
{Gewordensein) is to be grasped as a becoming. Here, Marcuse refers 
to the "has passed over" remark from the passage quoted above.®^ 
Some have therefore suggested that becoming is the first true 
thought in the logic. Gadamer is of this view, and he quotes the Lec­
tures in the History of Philosophy to back it up; One has acquired great 
insight when one realizes that being and not-being are abstractions with­
out truth and that the first truth is Becoming alone."^^ 
Why does Gadamer claim that Becoming is the true beginning? 
According to Gadamer, pure being and pure nothing are simply presup­
positions for Becoming. They are not things in themselves. We first 
think of Becoming—we cannot think the unthinkable pure being or 
pure nothing. Then we reason that, if change or transition exists, it 
must have changed from something. Only in becoming is difference 
manifested. Yet, Gadamer says, the converse is not convincing. Why 
should we think of Becoming when we light upon pure being or pure 
nothing? 
Yet, in so observing, Gadamer forgets that being and nothing are 
unthinkable. As we cannot think them, there is little use in observing 
that they do not imply becoming. What becoming/ceasing-to-be repre­
sents is not the difference between being and nothing but rather the 
difference between thinker and (failed) thought. Gadamer is right that 
there can be no derivation of becoming from being and nothing. Being 
and nothing represents a recollection by absolute knowing of what it 
63 MARCUSE, supra note 10, at 15. 
64 SL, supra note 1, at 83; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 67. 
65 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, HEGEL'S DIALECTIC: FIVE HERMENEUTICAL STUDIES 91 (P. 
Christopher Smith trans., 1976) (citing XIII G.W.F. HEGEL, WERKE 306 (1832)). See 1 
HEGEL'S LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 283 (E.S. Haldane trans., 1892) ("The 
recognition of the fact that Being and non-being are abstractions devoid of truth, that the first 
truth is to be found in Becoming, forms a great advance."). 
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once must have been. What becoming represents is ail the Science of 
Lo^c ceasing to be in the Understanding. 
Although the logical method depends on the sequence of Under­
standing, Dialectical Reason, and Speculative Reason, Gadamer rightly 
observes that the transition from being/nothing to Becoming is a special 
case. There is nothing dialectical about pure nothing. On its own, pure 
being and nothing is so little different that it can generate no synthesis. 
Any difference assigned to it is merely a matter of subjective belief, not 
Logic. For this reason, Gadamer emphasizes that pure nothing "bursts 
forth immediately" from pure being. "Clearly, the expression, 'bursts 
forth,' is one carefully chosen to exclude any idea of mediation and 
transition."®'^ 
Yet, Gadamer seems to be criticizing Hegel's claim that pure being 
is the beginning. The modulation between pure being and pure noth­
ing, which Hegel emphasizes, is, for Gadamer, an "untenable way of 
putting the matter .... I agree that it is untenable, but I do not 
read Hegel as making this point. For Hegel, the modulation between 
being and nothing is not what precedes becoming. What precedes be­
coming is thinking which fails to form a thought of its own being. In­
stead of contemplating its own being, absolute knowing finds before it 
nothing at all. In thought it has ceased to be. The beginning, Hegel 
says, "is to be made in the element of thought that is free and for itself, 
in pure knowingT^^ "Now starting from this determination of pure 
66 GADAMER, supra note 66, at 87. In the Miller translation, the sentence Gadamer is refer­
ring to is: "In the pure reflection of the beginning as it is made in this logic with being as such, 
the transition is still concealed; because being is posited only as immediate, therefore nothing 
emerges in it only immediately." SL, supra note 1, at 99; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 85. Gadamer's 
translation renders "emerges in it only immediately" into "bursts forth immediately." Id. at 87. 
See 1 WL, supra note 1, at 85 ("bricht das Nichts an ihm nut unmittelbar hervor."). A later 
remark by Hegel makes the point expressly: 
[TJhe transition of being and nothing into each other, ... it is to be understood as it 
is without any further elaboration of the transition by reflection. It is immediate and 
quite abstract because the transient moments are themselves abstract, that is, because 
the determinateness of either moment by means of which they passed over into each 
other is not yet posited in the other; nothing is not yet posited in being, although it is 
true that being is essentially nothing, and vice versa. It is therefore inadmissible to 
employ more developed forms of mediation here and to hold being and nothing in 
any kind of relationship—the transition is not yet a relation. [No ground or relation 
can be allowed.] The kind of connexion cannot be further determined without the 
connected sides being further determined at the same time. 
SL, supra note 1, at 103; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 89-90. 
67 GADAMER, supra note 65, at 89. 
68 SL, supra note 1, at 68; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 53. 
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knowledge, all that is needed to ensure that the beginning remains im­
manent in its scientific development is to consider . . . simply to take 
up, what is there before us."^^ These sentences show that becoming is not 
the beginning—even if it is the first determinate thought in the Science 
of Logic. Rather, the collapse of absolute knowing is the beginning. 
Nevertheless, Gadamer justly attacks the very question. How does 
becoming emerge from pure being? It does not emerge at all. Becom­
ing is absolute Imowing itself, as it stands back from its own failed pro­
position, learning from its failure that when it tries to think an 
immediate thought, it ceases to be in that thought and is alienated from 
its product.^" 
For this reason, the transition from pure nothing and pure being to 
becoming should be viewed as a non-transition, since transition implies 
a difference between origin and result. Hegel was aware of this when he 
referred to the fact that being "does not pass over but has passed over— 
into nothing .... Pure being and pure nothing are simply what 
becoming implies. 
Becoming, for Gadamer, is the first successful thought and is there­
fore the true beginning, because the thought of pure being is a failure.^^ 
But this interpretation wrongly presupposes that the beginning must be 
a success. I think Hegel intends for the beginning to be a failure, con­
taining a reference to some prior origin in spite of itself. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Hegel aims for a presupposition-free philosophy. Logic is a circle, 
as every Hegelian knows. Yet movement in Logic is a "lumpy, bumpy 
69 SL, supra note 1, at 69; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 54. 
70 As Hyppolite puts it, "[t]o know oneself is to contradict oneself since this is simultaneously 
to alienate oneself, to direct oneself towards the Other and to be reflected into it, or more 
exactly, to be reflected into oneself in the Other." HYPPOLITE, supra note 20, at 75. 
71 SL, supra note 1, at 82-83; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 67. 
72 Adorno agrees. He writes that, when Hegel deals with Becoming 
[H]e waits until being and Nothingness have been equated as wholly empty and in­
definite before he pays attention to the difference indicated by the fact that the two 
concepts' literal linguistic meanings are absolutely contrary. ... [I]t is not until their 
synthesis identifies them with each other that the moments will be nonidentical. This 
is where the claim of their identity obtains that restlessness, that inward shudder, 
which Hegel calls Becoming. 
THEODOR W. ADORNO, NEGATIVE DIALECTICS 157 (E.B. Ashton trans., 2000). 
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triangular wheel."^^ Logic progresses by dropping back and hazarding 
one-sided propositions doomed to fail in advance. This is just as true of 
Hegel's beginning. Pure being, which is pure nothing, is just such a 
retrogression. In the methodical progress that Hegel describes, the be­
ginning is a retrogression to the antepenultimate step—the appearance 
of the Understanding, the faculty of immediacy. Hegel's beginning is a 
failure, and that is why it succeeds. 
John Burbidge, V7here is the Place of Understandingy in ESSAYS ON HEGEL S LOGIC 180 
(George di Giovanni ed., 1990). 
